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PLAYING NICE IN THE SANDBOX: MAKING 
ROOM FOR HISTORIC STRUCTURES IN 
OLYMPIC NATIONAL PARK 
Christopher Chellis* 
ABSTRACT: As ambitious as it is at times challenging to meaningfully apply, 
the Wilderness Act purports to secure for the American people of present and 
future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness. Interest 
groups often seek to extract from the Act a meaning of wilderness that comports 
with whatever interest they wish to secure for themselves and their members, 
and their interests often conflict with each other. These conflicts can turn 
national parks into sandboxes where interest groups draw lines and ask the 
National Park Service to pick a side. The losing party inevitably looks to a judge 
who, in her infinite wisdom, will surely see that wilderness means exactly what 
the party knows it means. Injunction in hand, the now-prevailing party’s favored 
use will flourish and all will be right in the world, or at least in wilderness. A 
microcosm of litigation over competing uses nationally, Olympic National Park 
in Washington State has played host to its fair share of sandbox showdowns, the 
presence of historic structures in the park eliciting perhaps the most wide-
ranging response from interest groups. This Article examines arguments from 
those seeking to preserve these structures and those seeking to remove them, 
and suggests a reading of the Act and its Washington State counterpart that 
comports with legislative intent. 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO ISSUES ARISING FROM 
COMPETING USES IN OLYMPIC NATIONAL PARK 
Stuck between a rock and a hard place, the National Park 
Service (NPS) does not have the easiest job in managing 
wilderness areas.1 Those who depend on recreational use of the 
area for business will challenge a wilderness management plan 
restricting visitor access.2 Motorcyclists litigate $100 fines for 
riding over twenty miles in a protected area.3 A court shoots 
down an effort to introduce sockeye salmon into a lake because 
the project was a prohibited “commercial enterprise.”4 
Given its scenic beauty, diverse landscape, old growth rain 
forests, and distinct ecosystems, it easy to understand why 
Washington’s Olympic National Park5 (the Park) has inspired 
a series of use-related litigation not unlike the litigation above. 
A quick glance at the Park’s official website reveals pictures of 
hikers, backpackers, fishermen, and lodgers, all of whom visit 
the Park with different, and sometimes conflicting, uses in 
mind.6 What a quick glance at the website will not reveal are 
the historic shelters7 that dot the Park’s wilderness areas and 
sharply divide the purists from the preservationists. 
Interest groups sparring over permitted and prohibited uses 
within the Park is hardly new, but litigation over historic 
                                               
* 2017 JD Candidate at Willamette University College of Law. This Article was 
researched and written under the supervision and guidance of Professor Jeffrey C. 
Dobbins, Associate Professor of Law at Willamette University College of Law and 
Executive Director of the Oregon Law Commission.  
 1. Distinct from the colloquial “wilderness,” the legal “wilderness area” is “an area of 
undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without 
permanent improvements or habitation.” 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2012). 
2. See Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 
1999). 
3. McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283, 284 (9th Cir. 1965). 
4. Wilderness Soc’y v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 
5. Located just west of Seattle, in the corner of northwest Washington, Olympic 
National Park spans nearly a million acres, including 70 miles of coastline. NAT’L 
PARK SERV., Discover Olympic’s Diverse Wilderness, OLYMPIC NAT’L PARK 
WASHINGTON, https://www.nps.gov/olym/index.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2017). 
6. Id. 
7. Recognized shelters appear in the National Register of Historic Places, the official 
list of the Nation’s historic places worthy of preservation. The National Park Service 
provides a searchable database. See NAT’L PARK SERV., National Register of Historic 
Places Program: Research, OLYMPIC NAT’L PARK WASHINGTON, 
https://www.nps.gov/nr/research/index.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2017). 
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shelters in the Park’s wilderness areas came to a head in 2005 
in a case pitting conservationists against the NPS.8 
Attempting to reconstruct two shelters9 largely destroyed by 
snow and to preserve their place in the Park, the NPS flew the 
shelters to their original location in a wilderness area by 
helicopter after completely rebuilding them in a Park 
maintenance yard.10 Pointing to both the Wilderness Act’s call 
for earth “untrammeled by man”11 and the designation of the 
Park as a wilderness area in the Washington Park Wilderness 
Act (WPWA),12 a conservation group argued that the NPS had 
violated both statutes and that the shelters had no place in a 
wilderness area.13 Providing a different reading of the 
Wilderness Act and looking to the National Historic 
Preservation Act (NHPA) for support, the NPS argued that its 
actions were not only permitted but encouraged by the 
statutes.14 The case highlighted the differences between those 
who value historic preservation in wilderness and those who 
value wilderness free from any human influence, a common 
theme in legal disputes arising from park use.15 
A dense, ambitious, and often times ambiguous statute, the 
Wilderness Act requires a close reading to parse its practical 
effect on Park use. This Article therefore begins, in Part II, by 
providing historical context for the enactment of the 
Wilderness Act and background on the NHPA. There are a few 
key phrases in each statute, the interpretation of which will 
determine whose competing interest takes precedence over the 
other. Identifying those phrases and noting how Congress and 
interested parties interpreted their practical application to 
national parks before enactment will prove helpful in 
                                               
8. Olympic Park Assocs. v. Mainella, No. C04-5732FDB, 2005 WL 1871114 (W.D. 
Wash. Aug. 1, 2005). 
9. Id. The names “Home Sweet Home” and “Low Divide” are derived from their 
location in the Park. 
10. Id. at 3. 
11. Wilderness Act of 1964 § 4(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2012). The Act’s history, purpose, 
and function are explained in full in Part II. 
12. Pub. L. No. 100-668, 102 Stat. 3961 (1988). Its relation to the Wilderness Act is 
explained in full in Part II. 
13. Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J., Olympic Park Assocs. at 16 v. Mainella, No. C04-5732FDB, 
2005 WL 1871114 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2005) (No. 3:04-cv-05732). 
14. Defs.’ Cross Mot. Summ. J. at *8–10, 12–14, Olympic Park Assocs v. Mainella, 
No. C04-5732FDB, 2005 WL 1871114 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2005) (No. 3:04-cv-05732). 
15. Peter A. Appel, Wilderness and the Courts, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 62, 82 (2010). 
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analyzing how and why courts apply them in the cases that 
follow. 
In Part III, the Article introduces the plain meaning rule. 
The Article discusses why the exception to the plain meaning 
rule, which triggers a review of legislative history for clarity, is 
often and appropriately invoked in competing-interest cases 
implicating the Wilderness Act. The Article then establishes 
and uses a competing interest case sample, Wilderness Watch, 
Inc. v. Creachbaum,16 to explain how applying the exception to 
the plain meaning rule to the Wilderness Act’s minimum 
requirements exception—one of the key phrases discussed in 
Part II—leads to the conclusion that courts owe a great deal of 
deference to the NPS. 
In Part IV, the Article traces the evolution of competing 
interest cases specific to historic structures in wilderness 
areas, highlighting shortcomings in how the Western District 
of Washington (WDWA) has applied precedents. In Wilderness 
Watch, Inc. v. Mainella,17 the Eleventh Circuit provided an 
easily misinterpreted and misapplied opinion that, despite its 
narrow holding, the WDWA has continually misread so as not 
to afford the NPS due deference. In Olympic Park Associates v. 
Mainella,18 the WDWA misread the Eleventh Circuit opinion 
in Wilderness Watch to pit the NHPA against the Wilderness 
Act, creating a general versus specific provision fallacy, as if 
one statute must cancel out the other. Seven years after 
Olympic Park Associates, the WDWA further diminished the 
weight of deference given to the NPS by narrowing the 
threshold of acceptable wilderness administration in 
Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Iwamoto.19 The Article discusses how 
Olympic Park Associates and Iwamoto put the NPS in a 
precarious position; affording the agency just enough 
discretionary authority to attempt to administer the Olympic 
Wilderness, but qualified by the understanding that that any 
action protecting historic shelters from natural erosion would 
place the NPS in the Wilderness Act’s crosshairs. 
Finally, in Part V, the Article discusses how WDWA’s failure 
to recognize the historical context and legislative history of the 
                                               
16. No. C15-5771-RBL, 2016 WL 7231433 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 14, 2016). 
17. 375 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2004). 
18. No. CO4-5732FDB, 2005 WL 1871114 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2005). 
19. 853 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1065 (W.D. Wash. 2012). 
4
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol7/iss1/3
2017] PLAYING NICE IN THE SANDBOX 39 
 
Wilderness Act and the WPWA diminished the persuasiveness 
of the Court’s analysis in Creachbaum. The Article also 
sketches how a more complete interpretation of the wilderness 
statutes applies to the fact pattern in Creachbaum. 
By examining the history of the Wilderness Act and 
affiliated area-specific statutes, this Article emphasizes that 
wilderness area legislation has always recognized the value of 
historic preservation in wilderness areas. Certain actions are 
necessary to preserve historic structures, even when those 
actions would otherwise be unlawful in a wilderness area. This 
Article will demonstrate that historic preservation can be 
reconciled not only with the plain language of the Wilderness 
Act, but with the underlying philosophy of that Act, which 
emphasizes protection from excessive human influence. 
II. THE WILDERNESS ACT 
Understanding the tension at issue in Creachbaum requires 
familiarity with the core language of the wilderness statutes. 
The practical effect of what has been described as the more 
poetic language of the Wilderness Act may not be obvious to 
agencies, such as the NPS and the Forest Service, that are 
charged with following its directives.20 
The Wilderness Act provides for the establishment of a 
National Wilderness Preservation System for the permanent 
good of the whole people.21 The Act defines wilderness as “an 
area where the earth and its community of life are 
untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does 
not remain.”22 The Act further provides that an area of 
wilderness is “an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining 
its primeval character and influence, without permanent 
improvements or human habitation, which is protected and 
managed so as to preserve its natural conditions.”23 Subsection 
(4)(c) provides that “there shall be no temporary road, no use of 
                                               
20. Douglas O. Linder, New Direction for Preservation Law: Creating an 
Environment Worth Experiencing, 20 ENVTL. L. 49, 69 (1990); John G. Sprankling, The 
Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 560 n.213 
(1996); Kristine S. Cherek, From Trespasser to Homeowner: The Case Against Adverse 
Possession in the Post-Crash World, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 271, 284 (2012). 
21. Wilderness Act of 1964 § 4(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2012). 
22. Id. at § 1132(c). 
23. Id. 
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motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, no landing 
of aircraft, no other form of mechanical transport, and no 
structure or installation within any such area,” except as 
necessary “to meet minimum requirements for the 
administration of the area for the purpose of [the] Act.”24 
Subsection (4)(c), particularly the “minimum requirements for 
the administration of the area” language, has become the hook 
by which many a court has hung its hat in finding against the 
NPS in use-based disputes.25 
A. The Washington Park Wilderness Act and its Relevance in 
Creachbaum 
Congress saw fit to protect much of Olympic National Park 
when it enacted the Washington Park Wilderness Act of 
1988.26 Designating 95 percent of the park as the “Olympic 
Wilderness,” Congress recognized the value in maintaining a 
public park “for the benefit and enjoyment of the people,”27 and 
charged the NPS with “[t]he administration, protection, and 
development of the [Park].”28 While the text of the WPWA 
itself merely establishes the boundaries of the wilderness area, 
an analysis of its legislative history in Part III will provide a 
clearer understanding of congressional intent relative to park 
visitors’ permitted uses. 
At 1,370 square miles, the Olympic Wilderness is one of the 
larger wilderness areas in the state.29 The Makah, Quillayute, 
Hoh, and Quinalt tribes established reservations at the 
mouths of the coastal rivers by the 1850’s.30 European settlers 
fished, logged, and built homesteads, lookouts, and cabins 
along the Olympic Peninsula in the late 19th century.31 While 
                                               
24. Id. at § 1133(c) (2012). 
25. E.g., Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 629 F.3d 
1024, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010); Wilderness Watch and Public Employees for Envtl. 
Responsibility v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1092 (11th Cir. 2004); High Sierra Hiker’s 
Ass’n v. United States Forest Service, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1133 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 
26. 16 U.S.C. § 251 (2012). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at § 254. 
29. History & Culture, NAT’L PARK SERV., 
https://www.nps.gov/olym/learn/historyculture/index.htm (last visited May 14, 2017). 
30. People of the Olympic Peninsula, NAT’L PARK SERV., 
https://www.nps.gov/olym/learn/historyculture/people.htm (last visited May 14, 2017). 
31. Id. 
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many homesteaders moved elsewhere, the establishment of the 
Olympic Forest Reserve in 1897 signaled greater interest in 
protecting the area’s disappearing forests.32 The Forest Service 
built many ranger stations, lookouts, cabins, and barns to 
accommodate increased recreation in the area.33 When 
Congress established Olympic National Park in 1938, it gave 
the Secretary of the Interior the authority to administer, 
protect, and develop the Park, and it gave President Roosevelt 
the authority to expand park boundaries.34 President Roosevelt 
exercised his authority by stripping 187,000 acres away from 
the Forest Service and encouraging the development of more 
structures on this new land, including some of the shelters and 
cabins in dispute in Creachbaum.35 Exercising its discretionary 
authority, the NPS maintained many of these structures up to 
and after the enactment of the Wilderness Act and the 
WPWA.36 
Beginning in 2011, the NPS decided to rehabilitate and 
repair Wilder Shelter, Bear Camp Shelter, Canyon Creek 
Shelter, Elk Lake Shelter, and Pelton Creek Shelter in the 
Olympic Wilderness.37 Those doing the rehabilitating and 
repairing sometimes used helicopters and motorized tools.38 
Wilderness Watch, an organization “whose sole focus is the 
preservation and proper stewardship of lands and rivers 
included in the National Wilderness Preservation System,”39 
disputed the presence of these structures in the Olympic 
Wilderness and the lengths to which the NPS went to preserve 
                                               
32. Supra note 29. 
33. Appendix B: Extant Buildings Grouped by Historic Themes, NAT’L PARK SERV., 
https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/olym/hrs/appb.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 
2017). 
34. 16 U.S.C. § 254 (2012). 
35. The National Parks: America’s Best Idea, PUB. BROADCASTING SERV., 
http://www.pbs.org/nationalparks/history/ep5/4/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2017). 
36. WASH. ST. DEP’T OF ARCHAEOLOGY & HIST. PRESERVATION, Preservation Groups 
Unite to Support Historic Structures in Olympic National Park, WASH. ST. DEP’T OF 
ARCHAEOLOGY & HIST. PRESERVATION (June 15, 2016), 
http://www.dahp.wa.gov/blog/2016/06/preservation-groups-unite-to-support-historic-
structures-in-olympic-national-park. 
37. Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. C15-5771-RBL, 2016 WL 7231433 at 
*3 (W.D. Wash. 2016). 
38. Id. 
39. WILDERNESS WATCH, About Us, WILDERNESS WATCH, 
https://wildernesswatch.org/about-us (last visited Apr. 26, 2017). 
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them. Filing a complaint in October 2015 in the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Washington (WDWA), the 
organization challenged the decisions of Park Superintendent 
Sarah Creachbaum and the NPS regarding the five shelters.40 
Wilderness Watch alleged violations of the Wilderness Act and 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Taking issue with a 
lack of communication, the organization noted that “[t]he Park 
Service also authorized the work without notifying the public” 
and failed to provide the public with “an opportunity to 
comment on the proposed actions.”41 
DOJ denied that the NPS authorized the work without 
public notice and argued that the Wilderness Act justified the 
NPS’ use of helicopters and motorized tools for administration 
of the area.42 However, before looking to the Wilderness Act, 
DOJ turned to the NHPA to note how important maintenance 
of the structures are “as a matter of policy.”43 DOJ argued that 
the NPS “ha[d] the authority to preserve these historic 
structures in compliance with the NHPA and within the 
requirements of the Wilderness Act.”44 Adopting the notion 
that the NHPA is supplemental to the Wilderness Act—an 
idea discussed later in this Article—DOJ noted that “NPS 
interprets these statutes not as antagonists working against 
one another . . . but as legislation to be reconciled in service of 
NPS’ mission ‘to conserve the scenery and the natural and 
historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the 
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as 
we will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future 
generations.’”45 
A number of organizations interested in the preservation of 
the structures intervened46 and filed a response to Wilderness 
                                               
40. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against Defendant, Wilderness 
Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. 3:15-cv-05771-RBL (W.D. Wash. Oct. 27, 2015). 
41. Id. at 2. 
42. Federal Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 4, Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. 3:15-cv-05771-
RBL (W.D. Wash. Aug. 26, 2016). 
43. Id. at 2. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 2–3 (citing 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (2012)). 
46. Intervening organizations included National Trust for Historic Preservation, 
Washington Trust for Historic Preservation, and Friends of Olympic National Park. 
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Watch’s motion for summary judgment.47 Wilderness Watch’s 
and the intervenors’ arguments demonstrated “the breadth of 
opposing views regarding the management” of the park held by 
park visitors.48 At opposite extremes, Wilderness Watch 
argued that historic structures in wilderness areas were “an 
eyesore to be demolished” and prohibited by the Wilderness 
Act,49 while the intervenors argued that these same structures 
were “a national treasure to be preserved” and that the NHPA 
required such preservation.50 Rather than mine the Wilderness 
Act for supportive language, the intervenors looked for an 
NHPA workaround—something in the NHPA that might 
excuse the NPS’s action. Inherent in the intervenors’ approach 
to the legal problem was a concession that the NPS did 
something that, absent an excuse, was a violation of the 
Wilderness Act.51 
B. The National Historic Preservation Act 
This Article’s premise—that those seeking the preservation 
of historic structures in wilderness areas too often turn first to 
the NHPA—is based on the idea that the Wilderness Act 
provides the NPS sufficient support. However, a primer on the 
NHPA may help explain the statute’s magnetism. 
The NHPA provides for the preservation of sites, buildings, 
and objects of national significance.52 The Act further provides: 
[T]he head of any Federal agency having direct or 
indirect jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or 
federally assisted undertaking in any State and the 
head of any Federal department or independent agency 
having authority to license any undertaking, prior to 
the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on 
the undertaking . . . shall take into account the effect of 
                                               
47. Intervenors’ Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Wilderness Watch, 
Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. 3:15-cv-05771-RBL (W.D. Wash. July 20, 2016). 
48. Intervenors’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion Summary 
Judgment at 2, Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. 3:15-cv-05771-RBL (W.D. 
Wash. Aug. 26, 2016), ECF No. 48. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. National Historic Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (1966). 
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the undertaking on any historic property.53 
The Act defines an “undertaking” as “a project, activity, or 
program . . . under the direct or indirect jurisdiction of a 
Federal agency.”54 A regulation on the process of identifying 
historic properties provides that the agency “shall make a 
reasonable and good faith effort to carry out appropriate 
identification efforts, which may include background research, 
consultation, oral history interviews, sample field 
investigation, and field survey.”55 The regulation further 
provides that “[s]ection 106 of the [NHPA] requires Federal 
agencies to take into account the effects of their undertakings 
on historic properties and afford the [Advisory Council on 
Historic Preservation] a reasonable opportunity to comment on 
such undertakings.”56 
“[R]easonable and good faith effort” and “take into account” 
are to the NHPA what “minimum requirements for the 
administration of the area” is to the Wilderness Act. In other 
words, these provisions are the meat of the statute, the 
interpretation of which will likely determine whose interest 
takes precedence, or whose competing interest will be 
prohibited. As discussed in the following section, the plain 
meaning of these and other provisions relevant to Creachbaum 
are not so obvious and may require looking to legislative 
history for clarity. 
III. THE PLAIN MEANING RULE AS APPLIED TO 
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
The plain meaning rule provides that “where the language of 
an enactment is clear and construction according to its terms 
does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the 
words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the 
meaning intended.”57 Courts invoke the exception to the plain 
meaning rule when the same provision is susceptible to 
                                               
53. 54 U.S.C.A. § 306108 (West 2017) (formerly cited as 16 U.S.C. § 470(f)). 
54. 54 U.S.C.A. § 300320 (West 2017) (formerly cited as 16 U.S.C. § 470(w)). 
55. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b)(1) (2016). 
56. 36 C.F.R. § 800.1 (2016). 
57. See United States v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929); see also 
Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The “Plain-Meaning Rule” and Statutory 
Interpretation in the “Modern” Federal Courts, 75 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1299 (1975). 
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multiple reasonable interpretations.58 For example, one party 
may argue that the language is unclear, but it may be made 
clear were the court to examine congressional reports, 
hearings, and debates. When such doubt as to the meaning of a 
statute exists, the court may resort to legislative history for 
clarity.59 However, where the language is clear, the words used 
are taken as a final expression of the meaning intended.60 
While Wilderness Watch and the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) never explicitly reference the plain meaning rule in 
Creachbaum, it is clear from the pleadings that the parties 
disagree about the meaning of the same statutory provisions.61 
Section 1133(b) of the Wilderness Act states that “wilderness 
areas shall be devoted to the public purposes of recreational, 
scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and historical 
use.”62 The provision also states that “each agency shall so 
administer [any area designated as wilderness] for such other 
purposes for which it may have been established as also to 
preserve its wilderness character.” Section 1133(c) prohibits 
structures or installations and the use of motorized equipment 
“except as necessary to meet minimum requirements for the 
administration of the area.”63 
In an effort to show that its planned use of motorized 
equipment falls under section 1133(c)’s minimum 
requirements exception, the NPS will complete a minimum 
requirements analysis. For example, the NPS completed a 
minimum requirements analysis for Botten Cabin, Wilder 
Shelter, and Bear Camp Shelter in Olympic National Park in 
                                               
58. Webb v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC, 499 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Forte v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 780 F.3d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 2015). 
59. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 278 U.S. at 278. 
60. Id. (adding that “in such cases legislative history may not be used to support a 
construction that adds to or takes from the significance of the words employed”). 
61. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against Defendant at 10, 
Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. 3:15-cv-05771-RBL (W.D. Wash. Oct. 27, 
2015) (“[T]he Park Service repaired and rebuilt structures and used motorized vehicles 
in the Olympic Wilderness in a manner and to an extent that was not ‘necessary to 
meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area. . . .”); Defendants’ 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, 
Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. 3:15-cv-05771-RBL (W.D. Wash. Aug. 26, 
2016) (“Plaintiff incorrectly argues that NPS failed to determine whether each 
individual structure was necessary to meet the minimum requirement for 
administration of the area for the purpose of the Act”). 
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (2012). 
63. Id. at § 1133(c). 
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2011.64 The minimum requirements analysis has been 
described as a two-step process. First, the agency 
demonstrates that the proposed action is essential to achieving 
some Wilderness Act goal; show that it cannot be accomplished 
by non-prohibited activities—prohibited activities being 
activities such as the use of motor vehicles or motorized 
equipment.65 Second, the agency must demonstrate that the 
proposed action would minimize impact on wilderness values.66 
Under the NPS’s two-step process outlined in its 
management guidance, the agency first determines whether a 
use is prohibited by the Wilderness Act. If the use is 
prohibited, the NPS documents whether the prohibited use is 
necessary to meet minimum requirements for the 
administration of the area.67 The NPS then determines which 
activity will accomplish the action with the least negative 
impact to the wilderness.68 
In its complaint against Creachbaum and the NPS, 
Wilderness Watch argued that the NPS “rebuilt structures, 
and used motorized vehicles and tools to do so, in a manner 
and to an extent that was not ‘necessary to meet minimum 
requirements for the administration of the area for the purpose 
of [the Wilderness Act].’”69 While noting that the NPS “often 
utilizes ‘Minimum Requirements Decision Guides’ to 
determine whether a prohibited use is ‘necessary to meet 
minimum requirements for the administration of the area,’” 
Wilderness Watch argued that the NPS failed to: (1) address 
whether maintaining fewer than all of the structures in the 
Park would meet minimum requirements; and (2) explain why 
using helicopters and motorized vehicles to rehabilitate the 
shelters was necessary to meet minimum requirements.70 
In its answer, DOJ argued that the NPS “retains the 
discretion and authority to preserve cultural resources within 
                                               
64. Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. C15-5771-RBL, 2016 WL 7231433 at 
*3 (W.D. Wash. 2016). 
65. Eric Biber and Elisabeth Long, The Wilderness Act and Climate Change 
Adaptation, 44 ENVTL. L. 623, 673 (2014). 
66. Id. at 673–74. 
67. Id. at 674. 
68. Id. at 675. 
69. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against Defendant, Wilderness 
Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. 3:15-cv-05771-RBL (W.D. Wash. Oct. 27, 2015). 
70. Id. at 8. 
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wilderness, so long as the means used to do so are ‘necessary to 
meet the minimum requirements for the administration’ of the 
Olympic Wilderness.”71 DOJ pointed to Ninth Circuit 
precedent in citing to Wilderness Watch v. Iwamoto—discussed 
extensively later in this Article—for the proposition that 
historical use is a valid purpose of the Wilderness Act.72 The 
court in Iwamoto found that, because historical use is listed as 
one of the six public purposes of the statute, historic 
preservation could further the goals of the Wilderness Act.73 
DOJ argued that, to the extent that the Wilderness Act is 
ambiguous as to whether “historical use” embraces the historic 
preservation of structures, the “well-reasoned and long-
standing interpretation” of the NPS is entitled to deference.74 
DOJ also addressed Wilderness Watch’s argument that the 
NPS failed to explain why maintaining the five shelters in 
Olympic National Park was necessary to meet minimum 
requirements for the administration of the area.75 In 
interpreting the minimum requirements language, DOJ 
framed the relevant question as “whether this maintenance 
was necessary for the purpose of historical use of the Olympic 
Wilderness.”76 According to DOJ, Park officials considered 
whether the action to be taken for each structure was 
necessary or appropriate to meet wilderness objectives or the 
requirements of other laws, policies, and directives, and 
explained why it found that the action was necessary.77 Park 
officials weighed whether damage to the historic structures 
could be addressed through visitor education or actions outside 
                                               
71. Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 6, Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. 3:15-cv-05771-RBL (W.D. 
Wash. Aug. 26, 2016). 
72. Id. (citing Wilderness Watch v. Iwamoto, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1074 (W.D. 
Wash. 2012)). 
73. Iwamoto, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1075 (noting that the “Court has deferred to the 
Forest Service's conclusion that historical preservation furthers the goals of the 
Wilderness Act”) 
74. Id. (citing Vigil v. Leavitt, 381 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 2004); Iwamoto, 853 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1072 (W.D. Wash. 2012)) (“Defendants’ interpretation of the Wilderness 
Act must be given deference by this Court unless it is unambiguously contrary to the 
language of the Act, in which case no deference is owed”). 
75. Id. at 11. 
76. Id. 
77. Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 13, Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. 3:15-cv-05771-RBL (W.D. 
Wash. Aug. 26, 2016) 
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of wilderness, and found neither option would address 
maintenance needs.78 
DOJ highlighted the Wilderness Act’s ambiguity to counter 
Wilderness Watch’s claim that the NPS’s necessity analysis 
and determination was insufficient.79 DOJ argued that the 
statute “is framed in general terms and does not specify any 
particular form or content for such an assessment.”80 Citing 
two Ninth Circuit cases for precedent, DOJ argued that since 
the Wilderness Act did not specify particular content for 
necessity analysis, the court should defer to the NPS’ format 
for completing the necessity determination and minimum 
requirements analysis.81 
In arguing for the minimum requirement provision’s 
ambiguity, DOJ cracked open the door for a convincing 
argument based in the plain meaning rule, but stopped short 
of delving deeper into legislative history. Instead, DOJ argued 
that “historical use” is not ambiguous, but if the court were to 
find the term ambiguous, “the legislative history of the 
[WPWA] demonstrates that Congress did not intend the 
passage of the Act to require the destruction or removal of 
these historic structures.”82 Yet, DOJ never provided specific 
examples from legislative history to prove that Congress 
intended to preserve historic structures. DOJ merely argued 
that “Congress intended that [NPS] would retain its discretion 
to determine the best treatment for these historic resources in 
wilderness.”83 While that is true, there is more to mine in the 
legislative history of both wilderness acts, and the next section 
will reveal why DOJ should have looked deeper for support. 
A. Finding Clarity in the Wilderness Act’s Legislative History 
In its answer to Wilderness Watch’s complaint, DOJ 
                                               
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 6 (“To the extent the Wilderness Act may be construed to be ambiguous as 
to whether these terms embrace the historic preservation of man-made structures, the 
well-reasoned and long standing interpretation of these federal agencies is entitled to 
deference”) (citing Vigil v. Leavitt, 381 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
80. Id. at 12–13 (citing High Sierra Hiker’s Ass’n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 646–47 
(9th Cir. 2004)). 
81. Id. at 13 (citing Blackwell, 390 F.3d at 646–47 and Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. 
United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 629 F.3d 1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
82. Id. at 9. 
83. Id. 
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referenced but failed to define the Wilderness Act’s directive to 
the NPS to ensure the preservation of wilderness areas’ 
“wilderness character.”84 The failure to define wilderness 
character is understandable given that the Act itself appears 
to recognize differing definitions of wilderness—one 
aspirational85 and the other pragmatic.86 The first sentence of 
section 1131(c) defines “wilderness” as an area where “the 
earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, 
where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.”87 It 
states the ideal. However, section 1131(c) also provides that a 
wilderness area is an area to be protected and managed so 
man’s works are “substantially unnoticeable.”88 Perhaps 
clearer in theory, the line between “untrammeled by man” and 
“substantially unnoticeable” becomes more difficult to draw in 
practice. 
While Congress and government officials rarely spoke 
directly to how the Wilderness Act should treat existing 
structures and future development of structures within 
designated wilderness areas, they did hear public support for 
the preservation of such structures. Maurice Leon, Jr.—an 
avid outdoorsman based in Story, Wyoming—spoke before the 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs months before the 
bill’s enactment, arguing that “shelter huts” were consistent 
with wilderness character and preservation.89 Leon advocated 
for greater agency deference; “wilderness preservation is an art 
as well as a science and managed by those who know and 
respect it[,] it can be used by far larger numbers than use it 
                                               
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2012). 
85. Kevin Hayes, History and Future of the Conflict Over Wilderness Designations of 
BLM Land in Utah, 16 J. ENVTL. & LITIG. 203, 208 (2001) (“Although highly 
aspirational and a powerful tool in the preservation of our country’s natural resources, 
the full potential of the Wilderness Act remains unrealized”). 
86. Matthew J. Ochs, Defining Wilderness: From McCloskey to Legislative, 
Administrative and Judicial Paradigms, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 659, 679 (1999) (“Basing 
decisions on idealized notions or pragmatic considerations, those who are charged with 
applying the definition Congress incorporated in the Wilderness Act seem incapable of 
achieving a common interpretation”). 
87. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c). 
88. Id. 
89. S.4 A Bill to Establish a Nat’l Wilderness Preservation System for the Permanent 
Good of the Whole People, and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before the S. Subcomm. on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong. 262 (1963) (statement of Maurice Leon, Jr.). 
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now, in perfect safety from defilement.”90 
Speaking well before much of Olympic National Park was 
designated a wilderness area, Jack Dolstad (the official 
spokesman for the Olympic Park Association) stated, “[o]n the 
wilderness ocean strip, where the [student conservation 
program] has built trails over the headlands and constructed 
rustic shelters for visitor use, I am amazed at the number of 
people using these facilities both summer and winter.”91 
Noting that he had “recently seen backpackers traveling over 
trails that had not been used since pre-park times,” Dolstad 
suggested that the presence of shelters served the same 
interests the bill was intended to serve, so long as wilderness 
itself remained protected: “[w]e have in Washington State a 
future recreational gold mine, if we refrain from denuding the 
last few remaining wild areas.”92 
As revealing as the Wilderness Act’s legislative history may 
be, congressional hearings leading up to the enactment of the 
WPWA specifically highlight Congress’s intent with respect to 
historic structures in Olympic National Park. President 
Reagan signed the statute into law on November 16, 1988.93 
Over 849,000 acres of land and nineteen separate areas within 
Olympic National Park, Mount Rainier National Park, and 
North Cascades NP Service Complex fell under the protection 
of the Act as components of the National Wilderness 
Preservation System.94 Congress acknowledged that it 
designated certain lands in Olympic National Park as 
wilderness “[i]n furtherance of the purposes of the Wilderness 
Act,”95 and stated “[s]uch lands shall be known as the Olympic 
Wilderness.”96 Although the Act does not mention structures of 
                                               
90. Id. 
91. Bills to Establish a Nat’l Wilderness Preservation System for the Permanent Good 
of the Whole People, and for Other Purposes: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Public Lands of the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong. 166 (1964) 
(statement of Jack Dolstad). 
92. Id. 
93. James Tricker, et al., Mapping Wilderness Character in Olympic National Park: 
Final Report, OLYMPIC WILDERNESS IN OLYMPIC NATIONAL PARK (2013), 
http://www.wilderness.net/toolboxes/documents/WC/Olympic%20NP%20WCM%20repo
rt.pdf. 
94. The Washington Park Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-668, 102 Stat. 3961 
(1988). 
95. Id. § 101(a). 
96. Id. § 101(a)(2). 
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historic value in regard to the Park, legislative history reveals 
that Congress intended for historic structures to have a place 
in the Park. 
Six Olympic National Park rangers advocated for a change 
in the language of the WPWA “so that in the years ahead the 
[Park Service] [would] be less likely to again start removing 
rustic shelters.”97 Explaining that officials at the Park had 
started “tearing down or burning down perfectly good rustic 
cedar shake shelters . . . in the back country,” the rangers 
noted that “those shelters blended in very well with the back 
country environment, and [were] welcomed by all but the most 
dedicated wilderness purists.”98 The rangers also noted that 
“[the officials] stopped removing shelters only when people 
from all over the Pacific Northwest rose up with loud voices of 
protest, organized a group called Friends of Olympic Shelters, 
and demanded that park officials stop destroying back country 
shelters.”99 Prophetic of the tension at issue in Creachbaum 
and cases discussed in subsequent sections of this Article, the 
rangers distinguished between the purist backpacker and 
everyone else in reaffirming the need for the preservation of 
shelters within the Park: “[the backpacker] wants no sign 
whatever of man or his works while he is hiking . . . [b]ut this 
purist represents probably no more than one-fourth of the 
80,000 people hiking Olympic back country trails each year.”100 
Echoing the rangers’ desire to preserve existing structures, 
Washington Senator Daniel J. Evans said that “[i]t would be 
my presumption that designation of the park as wilderness by 
[the] act should not, in and of itself, be utilized as justification 
for removal of any of these structures from the park.”101 While 
acknowledging that some of the structures would need to be 
removed to protect wildlife in the Park, he said that “[f]or 
others, repairs and stabilization may be warranted to ensure 
                                               
97. H.R. 4146 Washington Park Wilderness Bill of 1988: Hearings Before the H . 
Subcomm. on Nat’l Parks and Public Lands of the Comm. on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, 100th Cong. 784 (1988) (statement by six concerned Olympic National Park 
Rangers) [hereinafter Park Rangers’ Statement]. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. 134 CONG. REC. 31,340, 31,342 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1988) (statement of Sen. 
Daniel J. Evans) [hereinafter Sen. Daniel Evans’ Statement]. 
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the preservation of their historic integrity.”102 Senator Evans 
noted that the NPS had “plans to evaluate each structure on 
its own merits,” and he hoped that through those plans 
decisions would be made “with regard to future use, 
maintenance, relocation, stabilization, or removal as 
appropriate for each shelter.”103 Recognizing that historic 
preservation could be complimentary to the directives of the 
Wilderness Act, the NPS would evaluate each shelter 
individually to determine the appropriateness of repair and 
stabilization. 
Senator Evans hinted at a necessary balance between the 
interest of park visitors and conservation, stating that on one 
hand “[t]he development necessary to accommodate park 
visitor[s] will be confined to the areas already developed, 
preventing further encroachment into the wilderness area of 
the parks.”104 On the other hand, he reaffirmed that the bill 
would not “shut the park visitor out of the park” but “ensure 
that all future generations of park enthusiasts will be able to 
enjoy the same wilderness parks that we enjoy now.”105 
Senator Evans recognized that “[t]he parks are there to 
provide for recreation as well as the preservation of a natural 
ecosystem.”106 
Washington Senator Brock Adams spoke of a similar 
balance of interests. Senator Adams said that “[w]hile people 
may continue to visit the wilderness areas, and thereby 
appreciate nature in its most pristine state, they will be 
prohibited from altering that condition.”107 While cautioning 
that “[o]nce designated as wilderness, the common signs of 
human activity—roads, buildings, and recreational facilities—
[would] be prohibited,” Senator Adams reassured those present 
at the hearing that the bill would not “cut off access to parks” 
because “[the] legislation makes exception for those areas 
                                               
102. Id.  
103. Id.  
104. Id. at 31,341. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. S. 2165 To Designate Wilderness Within Olympic Nat’l Park, Mount Rainier 
Nat’l Park, and North Cascades Nat’l Park Complex in the State of WA, and for Other 
Purposes: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Public Lands, Nat’l Parks and Forests of 
the Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 100th Cong. 27 (1988) (statement of Sen. Brock 
Adams) [hereinafter Sen. Brock Adams’ Statement]. 
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where human influence is already present.”108 Those areas 
would “retain their current status and use under Park Service 
direction.”109 In other words, prohibition of the common signs 
of human activity applied only to those areas where human 
influence was not already present. Senator Adams’ words seem 
to suggest that Congress intended for the NPS to retain 
discretionary authority in determining whether structures in 
wilderness areas would be retained or rehabilitated. 
Despite the clear intention that the NPS retain authority to 
make individual determinations on the status of each shelter, 
courts—particularly the WDWA—have rarely afforded the 
agency such discretionary authority, and it is hard to explicitly 
find it in the statute. Insofar as its influence on the NPS in 
Olympic National Park, an Eleventh Circuit case concerning a 
wilderness area in Cumberland Island, Georgia is at least 
partly to blame for this failure to recognize the flexibility 
inherent in the relevant statutes.110 The problems presented by 
that CA11 case, Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, have been 
exacerbated by the WDWA’s reliance on its holdings. As the 
sections that follow demonstrate, however, an accurate reading 
of Mainella establishes that its holding was, in fact, quite 
narrow. Several WDWA decisions misread Mainella, and 
appropriate application of its holding to Creachbaum and other 
cases would grant the kind of flexibility in Wilderness Area 
management that has thus far been absent from judicial 
decisions in this space. 
IV. WILDERNESS WATCH V. MAINELLA: THE NHPA AS 
SUPPLEMENTAL TO THE WILDERNESS ACT 
In Mainella, a debate over competing interests regarding the 
designated wilderness area in Cumberland Island, Georgia 
gave rise to a decision that courts and litigants alike cite for 
the proposition that the NHPA defers to the Wilderness Act 
when the two are in conflict.111 However, a closer reading of 
the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Mainella reveals that the 
NHPA only supplements the Wilderness Act, and the two 
                                               
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2004). 
111. Id. 
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statutes are not in irrevocable conflict. 
Wilderness Watch, a national advocacy organization, sought 
to enjoin the NPS’s practice of using a fifteen-passenger van to 
transport visitors across a designated wilderness area on 
Cumberland Island, which encompassed two historical sites. 
Congress designated most of the island as wilderness in 
1982,112 ten years after declaring the island a National 
Seashore.113 Visitors left their vehicles on the mainland and 
traveled by boat to reach the island.114 
The island contained two historic structures—one just 
outside the wilderness boundary (Plum Orchard) and the other 
in a wilderness area (the Settlement).115 Wilderness Watch 
disputed the NPS’s use of the van to transport park visitors to 
the historic sites because reaching both areas required the use 
of a one-lane dirt road that traversed the wilderness area.116 
The NPS initially drove vehicles that held four passengers, but 
began using a higher-capacity van to accommodate larger 
numbers of visitors.117 The NPS claimed that park visitors 
“piggybacking” along on its personnel trips yielded no net 
increase in impact on the wilderness character of the area.118 
The agency argued that the need to preserve historical 
structures furthered the goals of the Wilderness Act, and that 
its obligation to curate historic resources necessitated 
motorized access to the sites.119 Since the NPS argued that it 
had a separate duty to preserve the historical structures, the 
preservation of historic structures in wilderness areas was 
administration to further the purposes of the Act.120 
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, finding instead that agency 
obligations in the Wilderness Act and the NHPA were quite 
different.121 While the NHPA requires agencies to assume 
                                               
112. Cumberland Island Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 97-250, 96 Stat. 709 (1982). 
113. 16 U.S.C. § 459(i) (2012). 
114. Mainella, 375 F.3d at 1088. 
115. Id. 
116. Brief for Appellants, Wilderness Watch v. Mainella at 25–26, 375 F.3d 1085 
(11th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15346-HH). 
117. Mainella, 375 F.3d at 1090. 
118. Brief of Federal Defendants-Appellees, Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 
1085 (11th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15346-HH). 
119. Mainella, 375 F.3d at 1089. 
120. Id. at 1090. 
121. Id. at 1091. 
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responsibility for the preservation of historic properties they 
control, “any obligation the agency has under the NHPA to 
preserve these historical structures must be carried out so as 
to preserve the ‘wilderness character’ of the area.”122 The court 
found for Wilderness Watch, determining that driving a 
fifteen-passenger van through the wilderness area failed to 
preserve the area’s wilderness character.123 
In limiting its decision to the facts of the case—that the NPS 
provided motorized public access across designated wilderness 
areas in violation of the Wilderness Act—the court did not 
identify an inherent conflict between the NHPA and the 
Wilderness Act. “Congress may separately provide for the 
preservation of an existing historical structure within a 
wilderness area, as it has done through the NHPA.”124 The 
Eleventh Circuit decision recognized that the Wilderness Act 
and the NHPA can co-exist when rehabilitative work on 
historic structures survives minimum requirements analysis. 
In Mainella, the agency’s decision was impermissible not 
because the Wilderness Act took precedence over the NHPA, 
but because the court determined that driving such a large van 
so frequently through designated wilderness was not necessary 
to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the 
area.125 The following section will reveal not only how the 
WDWA failed to make this distinction, but also how the court 
created bad precedent for similar cases going forward. 
A. Olympic Park Associates v. Mainella: The General vs. 
Specific Provision Fallacy 
In a 1974 environmental impact statement (EIS), the NPS 
called for the removal of a majority of shelters within Olympic 
National Park. However, the agency also concluded that a 
number of shelters would be retained for health and safety 
purposes, including the two shelters at issue in the 2005 case 
of Olympic Park Associates v. Mainella.126 The agency 
determined in the same 1974 EIS that historic properties were 
                                               
122. Id. at 1092. 
123. Id. at 1096. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 1092. 
126. Olympic Park Assocs. v. Mainella, No. 3:04-cv-5732-FDB, slip op. at 5 (W.D. 
Wash. Aug. 1, 2005). 
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unaffected by wilderness designation.127 Despite the fact that 
the shelters collapsed under snow loads, the NPS later deemed 
the two structures eligible for the National Historic Register 
because they contributed to a historic pattern of shelter 
construction and recreational use.128 
In 2001, park officials proposed a plan to the State for 
rebuilding the collapsed shelters.129 Following notice and 
comment, the NPS determined that transporting the shelters 
by helicopter to their historic locations would pose no 
significant environmental impact. The agency found such 
action would preserve important historical aspects of the 
Park’s heritage and limit the amount of time spent 
reconstructing structures in wilderness.130 Nonetheless, 
Olympic Park Associates alleged that NPS’s replacement of the 
two collapsed shelters with new structures built off-site, as 
well as its decision to fly in a helicopter to accomplish the job, 
both violated the Wilderness Act. 
Favoring Olympic Park Associates, the court stated that 
while NHPA’s goals included rehabilitation, restoration, 
stabilization, and maintenance, they did not include 
reconstruction: “[w]here the former shelters at issue here have 
been destroyed by natural forces, NHPA does not require 
reconstruction.”131 Pointing to the Wilderness Act and its 
mandate on “preserving the wilderness character” of an area 
as a “specific provision,” and the NHPA as being “general,” the 
court restated the rule of statutory construction—specific 
provisions as being superior to general provisions where the 
specific provisions govern an issue—to find that the NPS could 
administer the Olympic Wilderness for other purposes only 
insofar as to also preserve its wilderness character.132 
The WDWA did devote some discussion to the wilderness 
character of the Olympic Wilderness, but the court’s analysis 
was limited.133 For example, the court noted that shelter 
                                               
127. Id. at 2. 
128. Id. at 3. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 3. 
131. Id. at 10. 
132. Olympic Park Assocs. v. Mainella, No. 3:04-cv-5732-FDB, slip op. at 11–12 
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2005). 
133. Id. at 13. 
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construction and recreational use were “in the past,” and that 
if the NPS had wanted to preserve history the agency could 
have taken photographs of the shelters as the structures once 
stood.134 In response to the NPS’s argument that the shelters 
were significant aspects of historic use within the Park, the 
court merely quoted the “untrammeled by man” statutory 
language.135 
The WDWA referenced Mainella’s distinction between 
natural and man-made features in wilderness areas.136 
However, that discussion played a negligible role in the 
Eleventh Circuit’s holding because the Eleventh Circuit never 
questioned the validity of the pre-existing, man-made 
structures in the Cumberland Island wilderness area. Rather, 
the Eleventh Circuit questioned the permissibility under the 
Wilderness Act of the great lengths the NPS went to provide 
park visitors opportunities to see the Settlement.137 
In Olympic Park Associates, the WDWA embraced only part 
of the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to fact-specific analysis. A 
more complete view of the approach was consistent with the 
legislative history of the statutes giving rise to the wilderness 
area at issue in the Cumberland Island case. Debate over the 
Cumberland Island Wilderness Act, for instance, recognized 
the tension between historic structures and wilderness free 
from human presence. In speaking to historic structures 
included in Cumberland Island’s wilderness area, Russell E. 
Dickinson, Park Service Director, stated that because “[t]hese 
are manmade features [,] [t]hey would be, by ordinary 
circumstances, considered an intrusion in the wilderness.”138 
When President Reagan signed the Cumberland Island 
Wilderness Act into law, he stated that because some proposed 
wilderness areas contained structures of historic significance, 
neither of those areas would have been wilderness within the 
                                               
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 9. 
137. Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1095 (11th Cir. 2004). 
(“Obtaining a large van to accommodate fifteen tourists hardly appears to be a ‘routine 
and continuing’ form of administration and maintenance”). 
138. S. 2569 A Bill to Declare Certain Lands in the Cumberland Island Nat’l 
Seashore, Georgia, as Wilderness, and for Other Purposes: Hearing Before the S. 
Subcomm. on Public Lands and Reserved Water, Comm. on Energy and Nat’l Res., 
97th Cong. 22–23 (1982) (statement of Russell E. Dickenson). 
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meaning of the Wilderness Act of 1964.139 In spite of whatever 
effect the Wilderness Act would have had on such structures 
absent the Cumberland Island Wilderness Act, the Eleventh 
Circuit read the latter statute to permit the presence of the 
Settlement within the island’s wilderness area. The WDWA 
overlooked this observation in its analysis and failed to draw a 
parallel between the structures on Cumberland Island and the 
historic shelters within the Olympic Wilderness. Congress 
recognized that while maintaining these structures within the 
wilderness areas might be viewed as contrary to the platonic 
ideal of a “wilderness area,” their presence was consistent with 
the creation and maintenance of those particular wilderness 
areas. 
Rather than engage in a discussion concerning general 
versus specific provisions, the WDWA should have limited its 
analysis (like the Eleventh Circuit in Mainella) to the NPS’s 
particular actions in relation to the historic structures, and in 
light of the initial creation of the Olympic Wilderness Area. 
When the court provided a fact-specific analysis, 
distinguishing between rehabilitation and reconstruction of 
historic structures, its observations read as logical and in 
keeping with Mainella’s minimum requirements analysis. 
Olympic Park Associates shows how district courts can easily 
misinterpret the relationship between the Wilderness Act and 
the NHPA to arrive at the conclusion that one statute must 
cancel out the other (i.e. the “general” versus “specific 
provision” discussion). Even when these courts focus on the 
wilderness-specific statutes, however, they can easily read 
them too narrowly, and thereby fail to reflect Congress’s intent 
with respect to designating the wilderness area in Olympic 
National Park. The following case exemplifies such a narrow 
application, with the WDWA restraining the NPS’s ability to 
exercise the discretionary authority Congress intended for the 
agency. 
B. Wilderness Watch v. Iwamoto: A Narrow Threshold for 
“Administration” 
Built in the 1930s, the Green Mountain lookout (located in 
                                               
139. Presidential Statement on Signing S. 1119 into Law, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 1107 (Sept. 9, 1982) (statement of President Ronald Reagan). 
24
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol7/iss1/3
2017] PLAYING NICE IN THE SANDBOX 59 
 
what would become the Glacier Peak Wilderness in the North 
Cascades of Washington State) went through a few 
rehabilitation efforts that included reconstructing its roof and 
reinstalling its windows, shutters, and door.140 Originally used 
for fire protection, the lookout became a popular hiking 
destination by the time Wilderness Watch filed suit against 
the Forest Service in 2010.141 The Forest Service maintained 
the lookout prior to its listing on the National Historic 
Register, but condemned the structure from public access in 
1994, pending repair on an as-funded basis.142 
After soliciting advice and input from interested individuals 
and groups, the Forest Service considered: “(1) dissembling the 
lookout and removing it from the wilderness . . . ; (2) relocating 
it to an area outside of wilderness; (3) burning it down; (4) 
leaving it alone to naturally deteriorate; and (5) stabilizing and 
repairing it, either with or without motorized equipment.”143 
In 1998, the Forest Service decided to repair the lookout 
using a rock drill and a helicopter to transport supplies, and 
issued a decision memo detailing as much.144 However, 
extreme weather damaged the lookout’s foundation, so the 
Forest Service disassembled and removed the lookout piece-by-
piece by helicopter.145 In 2009, seven years after the Forest 
Service removed the lookout, the agency hired the NPS to 
construct a new foundation for the structure.146 The NPS flew 
the disassembled pieces to the mountain and reassembled on 
site, which required at least sixty-seven helicopter trips in the 
wilderness.147 Wilderness Watch filed suit, and the court 
granted the group’s motion for summary judgment and 
injunctive relief.148 
The Forest Service failed to persuade the WDWA that its 
actions to preserve the lookout were justified in light of the 
Wilderness Act’s devotion to “historical use” of wilderness 
                                               
140. Wilderness Watch v. Iwamoto, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1065 (W.D. Wash. 2012). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 1066. 
143. Id. at 1067. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 1063. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 1079. 
25
Chellis: Playing Nice in the Sandbox: Making Room for Historic Structures
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2017
60 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y [Vol. 7:1 
 
areas and the agency’s responsibilities pursuant to the NHPA 
to preserve historic property.149 Wilderness Watch argued that 
the NHPA was merely procedural, requiring agencies to take 
properties into consideration when undertaking actions that 
may affect properties eligible for or included in the Historical 
Register.150 In contrast, the Forest Service argued that the 
NHPA authorized affirmative action in furtherance of 
historical preservation.151 The WDWA rejected the notion that 
the agency had any affirmative obligation to preserve the 
lookout pursuant to the NHPA.152 Instead, the court found that 
there was no conflict between the Wilderness Act and the 
NHPA because neither action nor inaction toward the lookout 
would have placed the Forest Service in violation of the NHPA, 
since the NHPA itself did not compel a particular outcome.153 
In this respect, the WDWA corrected course after finding a 
conflict between the two statutes in Olympic Park Associates. 
Instead, the court found potential conflict between two 
Wilderness Act provisions. The court recognized that the 
reference to “historical use” in the Wilderness Act’s Section 
4(b) created a potential conflict with an agency’s obligation to 
preserve the “wilderness character” of a wilderness area.154 
However, the court determined that “historical use” created an 
ambiguity requiring deference to the Forest Service’s 
interpretation that historical use was a valid goal of the Act.155 
Even so, the court needed to determine whether the Forest 
Service’s actions were necessary to meet the minimum 
requirements for administration of the area for the purpose of 
historical use.156 The principal issue, as the WDWA saw it, was 
                                               
149. Id. at 1070–71. 
150. Id. at 1070 (“Thus, according to Plaintiff, there is no basis for the claim that the 
Forest Service’s duties under the NHPA justified its actions with respect to the Green 
Mountain lookout”). 
151. Id. at 1070. (“[I]n the Service’s view, certain sections of the Act grant the 
Service more than mere procedural responsibility with respect to preservation of 
historic properties”). 
152. Id. at 1071. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 1074 (“[T]o the extent that the reference to ‘conservation’ in the list set 
out in Section 4(b) creates an instruction that conflicts with an agency’s obligation to 
preserve the area’s ‘wilderness character,’ the reference to ‘historical use’ in that same 
list would logically create the same conflict”). 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
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whether the decision to rehabilitate and reconstruct the 
lookout and use mechanized transport to do so was necessary 
for the minimum administration of the area for historical 
use.157 
This is where the WDWA showed too little deference to the 
agency’s discretionary authority yet also provided little to no 
guidance on where to draw the line between permissible and 
impermissible rehabilitative efforts in wilderness areas. The 
court stated that “the nature of the Forest Service’s initial 
decision to allow the lookout to remain in the wilderness area 
and to be periodically maintained . . . is entirely different than 
the nature of the . . . decision to fully disassemble the lookout, 
transport the pieces off-site by helicopter . . . [and] fly new and 
restored lookout pieces back in to the site.”158 Continuing, the 
WDWA stated: “[i]t is clear that the Forest Service went to 
extraordinary lengths to protect a man-made structure from 
the natural erosive effects of time and weather. The Forest 
Service went too far.”159 
In making its minimum requirements determination, the 
WDWA failed to recognize that there is no standard wilderness 
character—it varies depending upon the nature of the 
wilderness at issue. The court found that “less extreme 
measures . . . could have been adopted, such as relocation of 
the lookout outside the wilderness area, which would have had 
less impact on the ‘wilderness character’ of the area but still 
furthered the goal of historical preservation.”160 If the court 
had looked to the legislative history of the WPWA to define the 
otherwise ambiguous wilderness character of the Olympic 
Wilderness, it would have discovered that a historic shelter 
such as Green Mountain lookout is part and parcel of the 
wilderness area. As Washington State Senator Adams noted in 
a hearing shortly before the bill was enacted, the NPS was 
tasked with the administration of those areas where human 
influence was already present.161 The agency “evaluate[d] each 
                                               
157. Id. at 1075 (“The essential question at this point is whether the 2002 decision to 
engage in extensive rehabilitation and reconstruction of the lookout and the related 
use of mechanized transport was ‘necessary’ for the ‘minimum administration’ of the 
area for historical use”). 
158. Id. at 1076. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Sen. Brock Adams’ Statement, supra note 107. 
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structure on its own merits,” and exercised its discretionary 
authority in determining the most feasible option for the 
lookout’s repair.162 
The determinative question in any similar case may be, 
“How far is too far?” The WDWA’s decisions in Olympic Park 
Associates and Iwamoto put the NPS in a precarious situation, 
affording the agency its discretionary authority to administer 
the Olympic Wilderness, but qualifying that authority with an 
understanding that any action protecting man-made 
structures from natural erosion puts the agency in the 
crosshairs of the Wilderness Act. 
V. LESSONS LEARNED: RETURNING TO CREACHBAUM 
In its answer to Wilderness Watch’s amended complaint in 
Creachbaum, DOJ noted that the NPS interprets the 
Wilderness Act and the NHPA “not as antagonists working 
against one another . . . but as legislation to be reconciled in 
service of the NPS’s mission ‘to conserve the scenery and the 
natural and historic objects and the wild life therein.’”163 The 
WDWA, acknowledging that “historical use is a valid goal of 
the [Wilderness] Act,” appeared to recognize the need for this 
reconciliation in Iwamoto.164 While this recognition 
represented a significant progression from Olympic Park 
Associates insofar as to the court discussed minimum 
requirements analysis, the court stopped short of affording the 
NPS the discretionary authority the Wilderness Act provides 
the agency.165 
Iwamoto’s narrow interpretation of what constitutes the 
minimum and necessary requirements for the administration 
of a given wilderness area must be highlights the problematic 
ambiguity of and inherent tension in the Wilderness Act’s 
language. For example, the WDWA determined that since the 
Forest Service relocated lookouts in another national forest to 
a location outside the wilderness area, the Forest Service and 
the NPS had alternatives to using the rock drill and helicopter 
                                               
162. Sen. Daniel Evans’ Statement, supra note 101. 
163. Defs.’ Reply Mem. in Supp. of Their Mot. Summ. J. at 1, Wilderness Watch v. 
Creachbaum et al, No. 3:15-cv-05771-RBL (W.D. Wash. Aug. 26, 2016). 
164. Iwamoto, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1074. 
165. Id. at 1075. 
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in Iwamoto that would be consistent with furthering the 
purposes of “historic use” of the lookout.166 The narrowness of 
the WDWA’s determination serves to ignore important context, 
such as that the location of the Green Mountain lookout 
provided much of the structure’s historical importance, or that, 
in enacting the Wilderness Act, Congress intended for the NPS 
to evaluate each shelter individually.167 
Were the WDWA to apply the same minimum requirements 
standard it applied in Iwamoto to the facts in Creachbaum, the 
court would have found that alternatives to using the 
helicopter for shelter transport existed and thus the NPS’ 
actions violated the Wilderness Act. After reading Olympic 
Park Associates and Iwamoto, it is difficult to imagine a 
scenario where the court would find that no alternatives to 
rehabilitation existed. 
In failing to look to the WPWA’s legislative history, the 
WDWA not only did itself a disservice by setting poor 
precedent, but also left the NPS with a discretionary authority 
the agency may be afraid to exercise in the future for lack of 
knowing its real value. Legislative history reveals Congress’s 
desire for NPS to apply its expertise to minimum requirements 
determinations. Even if the WDWA were only to “pay ‘respect’ 
to the agency’s determination on this issue,”168 the court must 
acknowledge that Congress intended for the NPS to determine 
which rehabilitative efforts are most appropriate for each 
individual shelter. 
NPS maintenance of Wilder Shelter, Bear Camp Shelter, 
Canyon Creek Shelter, Elk Lake Shelter, and Pelton Creek 
Shelter was not the “further encroachment into the wilderness 
area of the parks” Senator Evans spoke of the WPWA 
prohibiting in 1988.169 Washington State senators drafting the 
bill, Olympic National Park rangers, and the general public 
made clear their intent that the WPWA ensure historic 
structures such as those in Creachbaum had a place in the 
Park after the statute’s enactment. If purist backpackers still 
represent no more than one-fourth of the people hiking 
                                               
166. Id. 
167. Sen. Daniel Evans’ Statement, supra note 101. 
168. Iwamoto, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. 
169. Sen. Daniel Evans’ Statement, supra note 101. 
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Olympic back country trails each year,170 the NPS maintaining 
these shelters after conducting minimum requirements 
analysis is in keeping with the Wilderness Act’s directive that 
the National Wilderness Preservation System exists “for the 
permanent good of the whole people.”171 
 
 
                                               
170. Park Rangers’ Statement, supra note 97. 
171. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2012). 
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